A time charter party was concluded in 1973 between two companies subsequently succeeded by the claimant (charterer) and the respondent (shipowner), both Belgian companies. The time charter party was to last 20 years with a possibility of extension. The claimant took delivery of the chartered vessel in October 1978. However, the vessel could not be used immediately as neither the substance to be transported nor the facilities where the substance was to be unloaded were ready. In 1981, the parties entered into a further agreement supplementing the charter party ('First Supplement'). The First Supplement contained a provision relating to the extension of the charter party after its expiry in 1998. In 1996, the parties began negotiating a possible extension of the charter party. In 1998, considering these negotiations to have been inconclusive, the claimant exercised an option to purchase the vessel, which it believed it had been given by a provision in the First Supplement that amended clause 2 of the charter party. The respondent objected and withdrew the vessel from the claimant, which initiated court proceeding to recover possession of the vessel. The charter party contained an arbitration clause and a choice-of-law clause providing for the application of Belgian law except for matters of general average, which were subject to the 1950 York/Antwerp Rules and, where these were insufficient, the laws and usages at the port where the vessel was registered. The claimant brought arbitration proceedings in which it requested the tribunal to declare that it had validly exercised the purchase option and to order various consequences resulting from this change of ownership. The respondent, in return, claimed for hire charges alleged to be due and unpaid, and damages for the claimant's failure to redeliver the vessel in accordance with the charter party. The respondent also claimed that the claimant's request was inadmissible under Belgian shipping law. The arbitral tribunal rendered a partial award in which it held that the parties had reached agreement on the extension of the charter party, that the claimant had not validly exercised the purchase option to which it claimed to be entitled, and ordered them to seek a negotiated settlement of outstanding monetary claims. Failing agreement between the parties, the arbitral tribunal rendered a further, final award in which, in addition to ruling on the monetary claims, it also addressed the respondent's allegation that it lacked jurisdiction.

Une charte-partie à temps a été signée en 1973 entre deux sociétés auxquelles ont par la suite succédé la demanderesse (l'affréteur) et la défenderesse (l'armateur), deux sociétés belges. La durée de la charte-partie était fixée à 20 ans, avec possibilité de prolongation. La demanderesse a pris livraison du navire affrété en octobre 1978. Celui-ci n'a cependant pas pu être immédiatement mis en service car ni le produit à transporter ni les installations où il devait être déchargé n'étaient prêts. En 1981, les parties ont conclu un accord additionnel complétant la charte-partie (appelé « First Supplement » (premier avenant)). Le premier avenant contenait une disposition relative à la prolongation de la charte-partie après son expiration en 1998. En 1996, les parties ont commencé à négocier une éventuelle prolongation de la charte-partie. En 1998, considérant que ces négociations n'avaient pas abouti, la demanderesse a exercé l'option d'achat du navire que lui accordait selon elle une disposition du premier avenant modifiant la clause 2 de la charte-partie. La défenderesse a fait objection et retiré le navire à la demanderesse, qui a engagé une action en justice afin d'en reprendre possession. La charte-partie contenait une clause compromissoire et une clause de droit applicable prévoyant l'application de la loi belge, sauf pour les questions relatives aux avaries communes, qui étaient soumises aux règles d'York et d'Anvers de 1950 et, au cas où celles-ci seraient insuffisantes, aux lois et usages du port d'immatriculation du navire. La demanderesse a engagé une procédure d'arbitrage et demandé au tribunal arbitral de déclarer qu'elle avait valablement exercé l'option d'achat ainsi que de déterminer les diverses conséquences du transfert de propriété. La défenderesse, en réponse, a réclamé les loyers considérés par elle comme dus et impayés, ainsi que des dommages-intérêts pour la non-remise du navire par la demanderesse conformément à la charte-partie. La défenderesse a également fait valoir que la demande de la demanderesse était irrecevable au regard du droit maritime commercial belge. Le tribunal arbitral a rendu une sentence partielle dans laquelle il a considéré que les parties étaient parvenues à un accord sur la prolongation de la charte-partie et que la demanderesse n'avait pas valablement exercé l'option d'achat dont elle se prévalait et a ordonné aux parties de rechercher un accord négocié sur les demandes pécuniaires en suspens. Faute d'un tel accord, le tribunal arbitral a rendu une autre sentence, finale, dans laquelle il a non seulement tranché les demandes pécuniaires, mais également statué sur l'exception d'incompétence soulevée par la défenderesse.

Una póliza de fletamento por tiempo se concluyó en 1973 entre dos compañías que fueron más tarde sucedidas por la demandante (fletador) y la demandada (armador), ambas compañías belgas. La póliza de fletamento por tiempo debía durar 20 años con posibilidad de prórroga. La demandante recibió la entrega del buque fletado en Octubre de 1978. Sin embargo, el buque no se podía usar inmediatamente ya que ni la sustancia a transportar ni las instalaciones en que se debería descargar esa sustancia estaban preparadas. En 1981, las partes concluyeron un nuevo acuerdo suplemento de la póliza de fletamento ("Primer Suplemento"). El Primer Suplemento contenía una disposición relativa a la prórroga de póliza de fletamento tras su vencimiento en 1998. En 1996, las partes empezaron a negociar una posible prórroga de la póliza de fletamento. En 1998, considerando que estas negociaciones no habían dado resultados, la demandante ejerció su opción de compra del buque, que creía que le había sido dado por una disposición del Primer Suplemento que enmendaba la cláusula 2 de la póliza de fletamento. La demandada se opuso y retiró el buque de manos de la demandante, quien inició un proceso judicial para recuperar la posesión del buque. La póliza de fletamento contenía una cláusula arbitral y una cláusula de determinación de derecho que fijaba la aplicación del derecho belga excepto en asuntos de avería general, que quedaban sometidas a las Reglas de York/Amberes de 1950 y, en aquello que éstas no fueran suficiente, las normas y los usos del puerto en que el buque estuviera registrado. La demandante inició el proceso arbitral en que reclamaba del tribunal que declarara que había ejercido válidamente la opción de compra y que ordenara varias consecuencias derivadas de este cambio de titularidad. La demandada, por su parte, reclamaba cargos de fletamento que afirmaba que estaban pendientes y sin pagar, y dalos por la no reentrega del buque por parte de la demandante según la póliza de fletamento. La demandada también alegaba que la petición de la demandante era inadmisible dentro del derecho naval belga. El tribunal arbitral dictó un laudo parcial en que mantuvo que las partes habían llegado a un acuerdo sobre la prórroga de la póliza de fletamento, que la demandante no había válidamente ejercido la opción de compra a la que decía tener derecho, y ordenó a ambas partes a buscar un solución negociada de las reclamaciones monetarias destacadas. Al no haber acuerdo entre las partes, el tribunal arbitral dictó otro, un laudo final en que, además de decidir sobre las reclamaciones monetarias, también trataba la alegación de la demandada de que carecía de jurisdicción.

Partial Award

'The opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal

32. The Arbitral Tribunal will first deal with Respondent's preliminary defence . . .

33. Article 9 of the Belgian Maritime Code provides that any claim in respect of the property of a sea-going vessel is admissible only after it has been registered. The registration of Claimant's claim - as Claimant has acknowledged - took place on 9 March 1999, i.e. after the Request for Arbitration was lodged.

34. However, the fact that the registration thus indeed took place after that the Request for Arbitration was lodged does not mean that the Request for Arbitration is not formally admissible and should therefore be rejected.

It appears from the discussions in the parliament that Article 9 of the Belgian Maritime Code is a mere application to ships of the rule contained in Article 3 of the mortgage law.

Now the Supreme Court held, in a judgment of 17 February 1984 (Pas. 1984, 1, no. 342, p. 706) that the only consequence of a default of inscription of the claim is that no award can be given as long as the inscription has not taken place.

In other words, the non-observance of Article 9 of the Belgian Maritime Code can therefore also take place after the submission of a Request for Arbitration as in the case at hand. This defence is therefore rejected.

35. The defence that the Purchase Option could not be exercised because the Parties decided, in the beginning of May 1998, to go "off the record" in their negotiations is also rejected. The letter pertaining to this matter - Claimant's letter of May 8, 1998, Common Bundle no. 88 - said the following:

2. It is our common understanding that any, discussions or negotiations between [Respondent] and [Claimant] concerning the aforementioned counterproposal shall be strictly off the record and without prejudice to the rights and obligations of [Respondent] and [Claimant], in particular with respect to the provisions of clause 2 of the Charter Party dated October 31, 1973, as amended, and that accordingly any such discussions and negotiations, if unsuccessful, will be deemed not to have taken place and the parties shall be deemed to be in exactly the same position as they were at the time of signing this document.

This understanding cannot be construed in another way than that:

(i) the negotiations had not been successful so far,

(ii) if the negotiations would not be successful during the off-the-record phase, the parties could take the same position as per 8 May 1998.

The main effect - if not the only effect - of the off-the-record character is, in the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal, that the Parties could not be bound by statements or concessions made during the (off-the-record) negotiations.

36. Obviously, the negotiations on the extension of the Charter party during the off-the-record phase were not entirely successful. But, in the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal, the conclusion would not be different if one would find that no agreement was reached between the parties on 30 October 1998 or on 8 May 1998: in both cases the Purchase Option pursuant to Article VIII of the First Supplement could in principle have been triggered.

37. Also the defence referred to [previously] that the incorporation of a purchase option in the Extended Charter party was impossible per se is rejected. Even if Respondent is right in arguing that the scope of the negotiations was "by definition" limited - which is denied by Claimant - the Arbitral Tribunal is of the opinion that, in principle, it is allowed for a party to try and extend such scope - also in a situation where, as in the present case, certain elements of the contract to be extended had been fixed already. Negotiations of the type at hand are commercial negotiations between experienced and sophisticated parties. Any party may, in principle, defend or try to defend its business interests as such party sees such interests, also by submitting certain proposals for negotiation. It is a different matter if the other party should accept or should have to accept any such proposal.

38. The said principle is limited, under the applicable Belgian law, by the general principle of reasonability or good faith, which has to be observed by parties in their contractual relationship. There is, in the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal, no evidence that the mere fact that Claimant brought up the matter of the new purchase option as it did, within the framework of the negotiations on the extension of the Charter Party, was unreasonable or against good faith. It is another matter if Claimant was entitled to try and force this request on the Respondent by exercising the Purchase Option, in case of refusal of the request pertaining to the new option by Respondent. Thereon, and on the other defences submitted by Respondent, the Arbitral Tribunal is of the following opinion.

39. Indeed, it can be established that Claimant, in the negotiations with Respondent on the extension of the Charter Party, asked for a purchase option that went beyond the Purchase-Option in the existing Charter Party.

39.1 As stated herebefore, the Purchase Option granted to Claimant under Clause 2 of the Charter Party, as amended in the First Supplement, reads as follows:

If no agreement can be reached upon the other conditions of this extension of the Charter Party, then Charterer will have the option to buy the Vessel at a price corresponding to the scrap value of the Vessel.

39.2 In the negotiations between the parties in the years 1996 - 1998, Claimant asked for a purchase option in the Charter Party - if extended - in wordings different from those of Clause 2 (as amended). During the said negotiations, 7 drafts for a new or extended Charter Party were submitted by Claimant to Respondent. The first draft was handed to Respondent at a meeting on 23 May 1997, the 7th (and last one during these negotiations) shortly before 30 October 1998. It follows from the various drafts that it was not only Claimant's wish to get an option to purchase the Vessel in the situation where the negotiations on another extension of the Charter party might fail, as was the case under the existing Charter Party, but also in the situation where the Charter Party would be terminated earlier before the end of the agreed extended term (which, eventually, was 30 October 2014).

39.3 The value at which the option were to be exercised differed in the various drafts.

In the first draft, the proposed purchase-option clause read as follows: "At the termination of this charter, Charterer shall have the option to buy the Vessel at a price corresponding to one BEF..." (Clause 4, second paragraph of the first draft . . .).

In the 7th draft, the proposed option clause read as follows: "(i) On 31st October 2014 or the date of any earlier termination or cancellation this charter, Charterers shall have the option to purchase the Vessel at a price corresponding to the scrap value of the Vessel at the time of termination or cancellation. (ii) The scrap value of the Vessel shall correspond to the mean value of three (3) written quotations provided by reputable shipbrokers." (Clause 58 of the seventh draft . . .).

39.4 Thus, it can indeed be said that the new option that the Claimant requested to be incorporated in the Extended Charter Party went beyond the Purchase Option in the existing Charter Party.

40. Also in this respect however, the Arbitral Tribunal is of the opinion that the mere fact that Claimant thus asked for an option that went beyond the existing Purchase Option was not against good faith. Also here, the observation made under no. 38 is valid. But the rejection by Respondent of this request cannot be considered against good faith either. . . .

41. The next - and crucial - question is if, subsequently, Claimant could for this reason - i.e. Respondent's refusal to accept Claimant's request for the new purchase option (hereafter: "the New Purchase Option") - exercise the existing Purchase Option.

42. The Arbitral Tribunal is of the opinion that this question should be answered in the negative. There is no evidence that Respondent acted in bad faith by rejecting this request.

43. Claimant has argued that it had a good reason to extend the circumstances in which the New Purchase Option should be exercisable and, therefore, to try and enforce it. Notably, Claimant has argued that the New Purchase Option should be exercisable in case of bad management by Respondent and/or money spent needlessly.

44. It may have been a reason from Claimant's point of view to try and obtain a new and more compelling option but the fact that Respondent did not accept this reason and the request for such an expanded purchase option cannot be considered to be against good faith, as Claimant's concerns could be adequately covered by other remedies. If there would be a situation, under the Extended Charter Party, of bad management or money spent needlessly, Claimant could seek recourse against that in law.

45. In the light of these considerations, Claimant was not entitled to exercise the Purchase Option as it did on October 30, 1998.

46. However, if Claimant's request for a purchase option also in the Extended Charter Party should be read as a request to maintain - mutatis mutandis - the existing Purchase Option, such a request cannot be considered against good faith and a refusal thereof by Respondent could not be considered in accordance with the principle of good faith. Respondent had accepted such a purchase option in the First Supplement. There is no good reason why a similar option would be unreasonable at the end of the term of the Extended Charter Party, if negotiations on another extension would fail. Further, the Arbitral Tribunal agrees with Claimant that it again could have a reasonable interest in maintaining some possibility of access to the Vessel after the end of the extended term, if negotiations on another extension would fail.

With respect to the price, it is undisputed that Claimant had paid all capital cost of the vessel already at the end of the first term of the Charter Party. If, in that light, the scrap value of the vessel was considered to be a reasonable price under the existing Purchase Option, the Arbitral Tribunal fails to see why that price would not be a reasonable price under a purchase option in that Extended Charter Party.

47. The Arbitral Tribunal is of the opinion that the parties have reached agreement on all terms of the Extended Charter Party, as evidenced by the document Hearing Exhibit No. 3 [last draft of the extended charter party agreement as annotated to reflect the status of the parties' negotiations on 30 October 1998], except on the New Purchase Option. There is no convincing evidence that the parties have not negotiated in good faith during the two years of their negotiations in this respect.

48. Claimant has argued that the agreement reached on the other elements was conditional, on its part, on Respondent accepting the New Purchase Option as requested by Claimant. Claimant has added that it would never have been prepared to agree to a term of Charter until only 2014 absent the inclusion of the Purchase Option, since otherwise it could not have been sure of maintaining access to [the vessel] after that date.

49. Claimant did not sufficiently prove that it expressed this condition clearly and unambiguously enough. Moreover, in the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal, this is not relevant: if Claimant would have based this condition on the element in its request for the New Purchase Option that went beyond the scope of the existing Purchase Option, that would have been against good faith and hence not effective under the applicable Belgian law. On the other hand, Respondent would have to accept, in good faith, an extension, mutatis mutandis, of the existing Purchase Option.

50. The applicable Belgian law recognizes the possibility of completing an agreement in the light of good faith, notably in a situation where parties have a certain contractual relationship (see S. Stijns, J.T. 1996, no. 35, p. 702). This solidarity duty is even more demanding in the event, as in the case at hand, of a long-time contractual relationship between parties and when the contract fosters a common interest of the parties (see Fontaine: Bonne foi, contrats de longue durée, contrats relationnels in Liber Amicorum Van Gerven, p. 541). The spirit of the long-time contractual relationship between the parties implies that the use of the Vessel be reasonably secured to Claimant as long as it needs it and performs its obligations.

51. On the ground of good faith, the agreement reached between the parties on the Extended Charter party as evidenced by Hearing Exhibit No. 3, should be deemed completed by the incorporation, mutatis mutandis, of the existing Purchase Option in the thus Extended Charter party. This (mutatis mutandis) also includes that the capital cost element will still be excluded also at that stage from the hire rate. Or, in so many words, with a purchase option of the following text:

After the extension period now agreed upon and if required by Charterer two years before the end of the extended period, Owner and Charterer will meet to negotiate an extension of the Charter party for a period to be agreed upon and according to the Classification Societies' requirements, and if allowed by same, taking into account that the capital cost element/fixed part of the hire: [sum of money]/m3/day will again be excluded of the hire rate during this period. Any expenses of classification works required to allow the Vessel to trade thereafter will be borne by Charterer. If no agreement can be reached upon the other conditions of such extension of the Charter party the Charterer will have the option to buy the Vessel at a price corresponding to the scrap value of the Vessel.

52. It follows from these considerations:

A) that Claimant's request for relief . . . and all further claims . . . and based upon the Claimant validly having exercised its option under clause 2 of the Charter party should be rejected;

B) that all counterclaims relating to the redelivery of the Vessel and for hire and other payments where such counterclaims are not in accordance with the terms of the Extended Charter party should also be rejected.

53. It follows equally that the other amounts claimed by both parties can be awarded only insofar as this is in accordance with the Extended Charter party . . . The Arbitral Tribunal expects the parties to reach agreement thereon in light of this Award. Respondent will have to reimburse Claimant such part of the hire it received pursuant to the provisional order granted by the President of the Commercial Court of [city] which exceeds the amount of the hire pursuant to the Charter party evidenced by Hearing Exhibit No. 3. Wherever appropriate, interest for late payments should be calculated at a reasonable rate under the circumstances.'

Final Award

'The opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal

29. Clause 52 of the Charter Party of October 31, 1973 ("the Original Charter Party") - reads as follows:

All disputes arising between the Owner [[Respondent]] and the Charterer [[Claimant]] relating to the interpretation or the performance of this Contract shall be finally settled by arbitration in Geneva (Switzerland) in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (Paris) by three arbitrators appointed in accordance with such Rules, provided that the arbitrator who may be appointed by the Court of Arbitration of the ICC shall not be a national of Algeria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Austria or Switzerland.

It is clear from this wording that the jurisdiction of a tribunal appointed pursuant to this provision concerns all disputes arising between the Owner ([Respondent]) and the Charterer ([Claimant]), related to the interpretation or the performance of that Charter Party.

30. There is no dispute between the Parties that this Arbitral Tribunal, duly appointed pursuant to the Arbitration Clause in the Original Charter Party, had jurisdiction to rule on the relief as originally requested by Claimant and by Respondent respectively.

31. In the First Award, pursuant to the relief thus requested, the Arbitral Tribunal directed the Parties to negotiate in good faith about the monetary claims in connection with their disagreement after October 30, 1998 and in the light of the Tribunal's decision. This Award stated further that in default of agreement, either Party might turn to the Tribunal for further relief, which implied that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to grant such relief.

The Tribunal had thus decided that it had jurisdiction to rule on the remaining pending issues. These pending issues were submitted to the Tribunal in the manner as described herebefore under . . .

32. The Tribunal is of the opinion that this means that it has jurisdiction on the said issues and that these issues are covered by the Terms of Reference which were agreed upon in this arbitration as issues to be decided by this Tribunal.

33. Also, it could have been expected that Respondent would have reacted more strongly earlier against the decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal in this regard, notably under the dispositive part of the First Award under 2, and/or under no. 53 of the considerations of the Tribunal. It is in confesso that Respondent did not deny the jurisdiction of the Tribunal before its Reply Submission of 15 November, 2001. It is also the conclusion of the Tribunal that Respondent, by not disputing such parts of the First Award in the Swiss Proceedings or otherwise, cannot at the present stage of the proceedings dispute this Tribunal's jurisdiction to rule on any request for further relief on any monetary claim as referred to under the said part of the First Award if the Parties would not be able to reach agreement amicably thereon.

34. But even if all this were different, the Tribunal is of the opinion that it has jurisdiction on the Claims as now submitted by either Party, insofar as they are closely related to the Original Charter Party. This opinion is based on the general wording of the arbitration clause in this Charter Party.

35. In the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal, taking into account this general wording, it has been or, in any event, it must have been the reasonable intention of the Parties to have disputes which are closely related to the Original Charter Party decided by an Arbitral Tribunal appointed under that provision and not by another Arbitral Tribunal. It cannot be the reasonable intention of Parties, when agreeing on an arbitral clause in their contract - of a general nature and wording as those of Clause 52 - to have disputes closely related to the contract decided by other tribunals or courts than the Arbitral Tribunal referred to in that clause. This is, in the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal, consistent with the approach under Swiss law.

36. It should also be noted that the Parties themselves, from the very beginning, did obviously interpret the arbitration clause of the Original Charter Party extensively rather than narrowly. Both parties took the view that this Charter Party had terminated on October 30, 1998. Nevertheless, both Parties submitted claims to this Tribunal related to the period thereafter. . . . In a narrow interpretation of the arbitration clause of the Original Charter Party, one could have argued that those Claims or Counterclaims did no longer fall under the scope of this clause but that they should, by lack of another arbitration agreement between the parties after the expiration of the Original Charter Party, be submitted to a State court. Rightly, in the view of the Arbitral Tribunal, neither Party took that view.

37. In this context, it should then be noted that, in fact and in law, a certain transitory period was created after October 30, 1998 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Transitory Period"). A period of uncertainty as to what the true legal relation between the Parties was, but with (a) certain obligations for the Parties until that uncertainty would be solved and (b) an obligation for the Parties to settle their accounts after this uncertainty would be solved.

38. This Transitory Period was first of all created by the decision in summary proceedings of the Commercial Court at [city]. In that decision, the Court has ruled, in anticipation of an arbitral decision on the merits of this case and on a provisional basis, that [Respondent] should continue to manage the [vessel] in accordance with the terms of the Original Charter Party, except for the Hire, which was temporarily and provisionally set at [sum of money] per month. This judgment foreshadowed that the Parties should settle their accounts after the Transitory Period thus created between this judgment and a Final Award on (this part of) the dispute in arbitration. Second, because indeed the Parties complied with this decision and entered into a Transitory Period.

39. This Transitory Period lasted until the First Award. As from that point in time the Parties knew that they were subject to the Extended Charter Party.

40. The main dispute under the Original Charter Party revolved around the Option Clause in that Charter Party but developed into a dispute on the Transitory Period. Notably on the question how the Parties should settle their accounts over that Period. That part of the dispute is therefore clearly so closely connected to the original dispute between the Parties that it falls under the scope of the Arbitration Clause in the original Charter Party. The directions given by the Tribunal in its First Award should be understood in that light.

41. Therefore, a distinction should be made between that part of the dispute and other disputes which may not be so closely related to the original Charter Party and/or the Transitory Period thereafter but purely to the Extended Charter Party. For the first category, the Arbitration Clause of the Original Charter Party takes precedence over the Arbitration Clause of the Extended Charter Party. For the second category, this is the other way round.

The first category falls under the scope of the Terms of Reference signed in November 1999, the second category does not. There is no reason to refer any dispute under the first category to arbitration in London or order the Parties to embark on such arbitration. That is, in the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal, the common intention of the Parties as it should be recognized and implemented.

42. The fact that certain amounts can be awarded only in so far as this is in accordance with the Extended Charter Party, as evidenced by Hearing Exhibit No. 3, does not alter this. This fact should be distinguished from the question of the jurisdiction.

43. On the basis of the foregoing, the Arbitral Tribunal concludes that it has jurisdiction on all of Claimant's Claims referred to herebefore under 18 and 19 (except, in part, for the request that all Respondent's Counterclaims are dismissed as this request, for those Counterclaims to be mentioned hereafter, touches upon the jurisdiction of the Tribunal) and on Respondent's Counterclaims referred to here before under 21(i), (iii), (vi) and (vii) and, partly, for the Hire referred to under 21 (ii).

44. The Tribunal concludes that it has no jurisdiction with respect to Respondent's Counterclaims referred to under 21(iv) and (v).

45. With respect to Respondent's Request for Relief as referred to under 21(ii) herebefore, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to establish the hire as such under the Extended Charter Party. It does have jurisdiction to rule on the amounts to be settled by the Parties during the Transitory Period.

46. In addition the Arbitral Tribunal makes the following observations.

(i) With respect to the invalidation of the Terms of Reference by Respondent on the ground of essential error, it follows from what has been said herebefore that the Claims on which the Arbitral Tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction fall within the scope of the Terms of Reference as signed pursuant to the arbitral clause in the Original Charter Party. Thus, the basis for invoking error - viz. Respondent being ignorant at that point in time of the Extended Charter Party - is not relevant. Besides, even if the Terms of Reference would be invalidated, this would not entail the invalidity of the original arbitration clause, under which the said Claims could be ruled upon.

(ii) The Arbitral Tribunal has not denied all of Claimant's Claims in the First Award. It has denied (rejected) all claims submitted by Claimant which were based on the presumption that the option under clause 2 of the Original Charter Party was validly exercised. Besides, it has explicitly decided that the Parties could turn to the Tribunal for further relief if - in summary - no agreement could be reached among them for the monetary claims referred to at 2 of the dispositive part of the Award and on any other claim and/or counterclaim which had not been ruled upon.

(iii) The Claims as formulated by Claimant in the present phase of the proceedings are not new Claims in the sense that they would fall under the scope of the new arbitral clause instead of under the original arbitral clause. This is clear when one compares Claimant's original claims as quoted in the First Award under 19(5), (6), (7) and (8) with the present claims as referred to under 18 here before.

(iv) Since, with respect to certain claims, the Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction, no other Tribunal is deprived of its jurisdiction hereto.

(v) The Parties agree that, under the applicable Swiss law, the effect of the Original Arbitration Clause and its relation to the arbitral clause in the Extended Charter Party is a matter of interpretation of that clause. The Arbitral Tribunal considers the interpretation given by it herebefore the most reasonable interpretation, and the common intent of the Parties as it should be recognized.'